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I. INTRODUCTION
If Gillian Hadfield's intention in writing "Legal Infrastructure and
the New Economy", was to spark thinking on the future of legal
practice in the emerging wired age, she has succeeded admirably. She
diagnoses several serious inadequacies in the legal representation
available to clients in the high-tech industries around computing and
the Internet, and puts them helpfully into the framework of
"infrastructure," her term for the mix of people, rules, knowledge, and
practice that is law as it exists in day-to-day application. So far so
good. If her intention, however, was to suggest specific steps forward,
then she was less successful.
Professor Hadfield breaks her argument down into three parts:
first, she describes a new economy and suggests how its need for legal
services will be different;2 second, she explores the inadequacies of the
legal services available to actors in the new economy, framing her
discussion in terms of "legal infrastructure;"3 and third, she points to
restraints on the market for legal services which she postulates are the
source of the inadequacies.4 Even though I broadly agree with
Professor Hadfield's suggestions and conclusions as separate
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propositions, I do not think she has fleshed out or connected the
points so as to make the case for their linkage in this context.
To begin, the challenges that Professor Hadfield identifies are in
fact not wholly new. Older information industries like television and
film evolved much of the light but effective contracting touch her
general counsel subjects long for; they also faced some of the
jurisdictional complexity she identifies. There are models on which to
draw; models that suggest at least some of the infrastructure she is
looking for can exist in the current legal ecosystem. And conversely,
the market-based solutions she suggests are worthy, but do not really
address the problems she is identifying. The solutions will have only
limited impact on the problems she is addressing. To begin with, the
solutions are also insufficiently bold. Her remedies could go much
further in embracing the techniques of the New Economy to create
even better solutions. To fully succeed, her project needs to be better
informed about history, and bolder in looking to the future.
II. AN "N" OF ONE-EXPERIENCES IN THE "OLD" ECONOMY
OF FILM AND TELEVISION
Legal scholarship is notorious for often being only lightly tethered
to facts. Unfortunately, Professor Hadfield's initial data points about
the dissatisfactions of general counsel are simply too anecdotal and
limited to be convincing. She quotes five people from the technology
industry and one from television who basically complain that they
can't get good help these days.5 This claim may indeed be true, but an
article that calls for major overhauls in the structure of the entire legal
profession needs more support than this. She herself admits that her
survey is "hardly a scientific sample," and that her evidence is "partial
and anecdotal."6 To successfully generalize the needs of a few general
counsel as an indictment of the legal infrastructure as a whole,
however, Professor Hadfield needs some additional data points.
By way of a somewhat contrary anecdote (and falling into the trap
of a subjectively grounded assertion myself), I offer the single data
point of my own experience, now largely twenty years in the past, as a
practicing lawyer representing transactional clients in the
entertainment industry, with a particular specialty in television. The
list of requirements set out by Professor Hadfield as "new" in the
5 Id. at 3-5.
6 Id. at 5, 29.
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twenty-first century tech landscape resonates with many of the
challenges faced by television in the twentieth century.7 Of course
there are differences, but the similarities are strong enough to allow
comparison to most of Professor Hadfield's points on her list of how
the new economy is transforming legal demand.
Her first pair of topics relates to jurisdictional boundary crossing,8
and television was (and still is) an international business. It has
markets and players around the world, and is subject to hard-to-
reconcile inter-jurisdictional conflicts around regulations, content
requirements, intellectual property, financial practices, and
contracting standards. Sound familiar? Creating both individual
knowledge and networks of expertise across these jurisdictional
requirements was a challenge then, made even harder by the
limitations of communication and search in a pre-Internet age. Some
assets that made me, as a practitioner, reasonably attractive to clients
were a useable knowledge of the international legal landscape and a
stable of lawyers in the principal international jurisdictions whom I
trusted to be able to help when greater local expertise was necessary.
With the addition of the web I could probably have done better. What
is ailing lawyers in the tech field?
The next cluster of topics relates to the complexity, speed, and
individuality that characterize transactions in information.9 While the
details are of course different, transactions in the information
industries of film and television had needs remarkably similar to
Professor Hadfield's New Economy. Each production, after all, was
(and still is) a sui generis project that required putting together tens,
even hundreds, of quick, interlocking deals for rights, scripts, acting
talent, music, technical help, etc. And talk about intolerance for legal
expense-most productions operated on tight budgets, and the push to
keep costs reasonable was a constant refrain I heard from clients.
Finally, Professor Hadfield lists a greater demand for integration
of legal and business expertise.1o This is a refrain heard from business
clients in many industries and is an area where reform in legal
education, to increase the exposure to business and financial concepts,
would be very helpful. In the entertainment field, the quality of my
7 See id. at 18-23.
8 Id. at 20-21.
9 Id. at 21-22.
lo Id. at 23.
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own services to clients increased significantly as I grew more expert
on the workings of the business itself. Many companies
institutionalize this combined expertise in an in-house role called
"business affairs." When I teach Entertainment Law, I try to address
the need for industry knowledge by devoting the first week of classes
entirely to what the business is and how it works. I am also the co-
author with Howard Blumenthal, a producer and executive, of a book
called This Business of Television, which seeks to present law and
business as mutually dependent subjects in a single work.,, A feature
of this book, by the by, is an appendix full of short form contracts and
accompanying checklists aimed at allowing quick yet reasonably
tailored responses to the contracting needs of a fast-moving
industry.12
I do not mean to claim any special prescience or depth of insight
for these efforts-rather just the reverse. There is an active
entertainment bar with attitudes and capabilities similar to my own,
and others have published good collections of reasonable contracting
forms for film and television.13 Furthermore, similar legal
representation practices appear to be present in the construction
industry.14 Rather, my claim (sparsely supported as it may be) is that
there are commonalities between the supposedly novel challenges of
the "New Economy" and those faced by "older" media and
entertainment clients, and that these common challenges were at least
partly addressed by lawyers and clients in the "old days." This claim, if
true, has a mixed impact on Professor Hadfield's argument. The fact
that the challenges are long-standing in some ways adds strength to
her call for further reform. However, my assertion that the existing
system produced at least some workable solutions and the fact that
these solutions are largely unaddressed in Professor Hadfield's
treatment, undercuts her argument that the existing infrastructure
cannot meet the need and her call for regulatory change in legal
practice as the best way to address these challenges.
III. Is LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE THE PROBLEM?
"HOWARD J. BLUMENTHAL & OLIVER R. GOODENOUGH, THIS BUSINESS OF TELEVISION (Bob
Nirkind ed., 3rd ed. 2006).
12 Id. at 495-555.
13 E.g., MARK LITWAK, CONTRACTS FOR THE FILM & TELEVISION INDUSTRY (2d ed. 1998).
14 See JONATHAN J. SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTRACTS (5th ed. 2008).
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After her analysis of the complaints of in-house counsel about
getting good legal help for the New Economy, Professor Hadfield
turns to the topic of her title: our "legal infrastructure." She defines
this as, "the accumulated stock of what legal actors-broadly defined-
produce."5 Her thesis is that the current infrastructure is inadequate
and that the gaps in demand and supply she points to in her anecdotes
are evidence that it is not working as it should. In this, I am in
agreement. What needs better evidence, however, is why the gaps
exist. One of the characteristics of infrastructure is that it is frequently
a public good, and not a private one. Economic theory suggests that
an increasing reliance on market-based solutions of the kind
ultimately proposed by Professor Hadfield may not be the best way to
solve a public goods problem.
Turning again to Professor Hadfield's approach, the supposedly
failing model she most frequently invokes is that of large, well-funded
companies seeking help from large, well-educated firms of lawyers-a
model some call "Big Law." Again, I can offer a partially confirming,
partially contradicting example with an "N" of one, incorporating
some small dose of experience from a generation ago. Before shifting
to the entertainment practice I described above, which took place
principally at a New York firm called Kay Collyer & Boose, I was an
associate for two and a half years at the New York office of Cleary,
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, an archetypal example of the kind of
astonishingly thorough, supremely careful, and very expensive law
firm Professor Hadfield sees as out of step with the needs of the New
Economy.
Hadfield asserts that these attributes of Big Law are defects, and in
some contexts, like the New Economy, that may well be true. But that
begs a question: if Big Law is so counterproductive, how did it come to
exist? These behemoths are artifacts produced in, what is in fact, a
very competitive free market, at least in the supplier-buyer
relationship. Major and mid-sized law firms in locations across the
country fight tooth and nail to land representation. No one puts guns
to the heads of general counsel and says, "Hire Cravath." There must
be reasons why Big Law has, until recently, grown and prospered.
Exploring these reasons needs to be part of the discussion Professor
Hadfield urges on us.
The big firm model is, to a large degree, the product of corporate
finance, an industry with needs very different from those identified by
Professor Hadfield. In corporate finance, huge values are at stake in
15 Hadfield, supra note 1, at 25.
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what are often individualized deals, and the risk profiles in
transactions acceptable to clients are very different from those faced
in daily business by innovative web-providers. The lawyer care that
clients desire and are willing to pay for may indeed be well provided
by Big Law in the corporate finance context. Furthermore, the desired
certitude of interpretation on which financial transactions depend
supports the kind of elaborate documentation of rules and contracts
that Professor Hadfield criticizes. The deployment by a client of "over
the top" lawyers can actually have its own value in this milieu.
Evolutionary game theory reminds us that the huge rack of antlers
that a mature, male elk carries about has its rationale. It may well be
expensive to grow and it certainly inhibits supple movement, but it
sends a signal of ability in a particular form of stylized combat that
may be worth the cost in the escalating arms race of Darwinian
"sexual selection." Similarly, displaying and perhaps even using
Skadden Arps in a takeover battle between corporate mastodons may
be worth every penny. The fact that it would be an expensive error to
deploy this kind of care and cost on a quick tech deal does not negate
their value in a different context. Rather than a single legal
infrastructure, what we probably need are diverse possibilities-
including one that will meet the needs of the New Economy managers
like Professor Hadfield's high tech general counsel.
So, if we need a different infrastructure for players in the New
Economy, how do we get there? To my ear, the complaints of the New
Economy general counsel reflect their own failure in firm selection
and task specification as much as a problem with suppliers. Many of
the "missing bridges and roads"16 Professor Hadfield speaks of would
be built if the demand for them were unequivocally expressed and
pursued by the client side. There are probably dozens, perhaps even
hundreds of firms in the United States that would be interested in
getting legal work from a company like Google and that have the
potential for competently adopting a lawyering approach like that
described by Professor Hadfield.
Even within the old model of firm-based representation, it would
be possible to require firms that want this work to first present a
portfolio of shorter form contracts that they feel comfortable using.
Some firms may shy away from this, but I would be astounded if
several were not willing to make the investment. And an increasing
number of companies are asking the firms that represent them to lend
associates and partners to the client for a specified time to learn the
16 See id. at 28-29.
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business in just the ways Professor Hadfield calls for.17 It does not take
a restructuring of the capital investment rules in law firms, good idea
as that may be, to make this possible, so much as a client willing to
make service re-design a priority and to accept the consequences of
occasional deal complications that might spring from decreased
lawyer micro-attention.
IV. SOURCE OF REAL REFORM 1: PUBLIC GOODS DEVELOPMENT AND
THE DISTRIBUTED APPROACHES OF THE NEW ECONOMY ITSELF
Seen in this light, Professor Hadfield's call for reforming the legal
infrastructure for the technology industry is not so much a private
goods problem to be solved by a better and cheaper source of supply
in the dyadic client-lawyer relationship, but a public goods and
coordination problem across the industry as a whole. If companies
and the firms that represent them stand to gain some short term
advantage from adding a documentation or negotiation complication
to the transaction process, then they are likely to do so, even if the
cumulative impact of this arms race, like the huge antlers of the elk, is
a burden for the industry as a whole. A solution to this may require
coordinated action across the many players in the industry to restrain
short-term gain for long-term mutual benefit-the classic public goods
scenario. This kind of problem may be best resolved by public-spirited
gatherings and efforts by industry associations, or by the development
of forms in non-profit contexts, like the Creative Commons licenses
that have proved so useful. Relaxing law practice restrictions and
investment rules, the steps advocated by Professor Hadfield, might
help this process, but they are not central to it.18
Once again, it may be helpful to draw on the entertainment
industry for examples. There, some of the short form usage is made
possible by the existence of a high level of repeat play within a small
group of industry actors that makes defection potentially costly. For
instance, I have seen commitments of tens of millions of dollars
supported only by a brief thank you letter from one CEO to another.
'7E.g., Lorelei Laird, Lending Lawyers: Secondments Gaining Popularity, CORPORATE
COUNSEL (May 20, 2008), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202421517914.
Gina Passarella, Loaning Out Lawyers to Get a Bigger Piece of the Corporate Pie,
CORPORATE COUNSEL (Oct. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.aw.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1161767119173.
18 See Hadfield, supra note 1, at 50-57.
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When I inquired about this to one of the in-house lawyers involved,
the story was that they and the lawyers for the other company used to
send fifty page forms back and forth, negotiating furiously. As it
turned out, although these forms were seldom settled or signed, the
deals went forward anyway, and eventually the lawyers just gave up
and made sure at least a thank you was on file. And so the
infrastructure evolved. This kind of non-law anchoring in film and
television is also supported by the existence of a cadre of
knowledgeable agents who act as repeat-play gatekeepers for all kinds
of transactions. Another factor in promoting relatively cheap
uniformity is the presence of strong unions whose basic agreements
provide a framework of agreed complexity within which quick
contracting in individual cases is possible. All of these structural
elements have costs as well as advantages, but none of them requires a
change in who can provide capital to a law firm.
V. SOURCE OF REAL REFORM 2: NETWORKS, CROWD-SOURCING, AND
OTHER NEW ECONOMY APPROACHES
One of the discoveries of the New Economy is that there is wisdom
not just in closely held and selected experts, but also in disbursed
individuals acting alone or through loosely organized networks, often
motivated by rewards like acclaim or prizes. The New Economy might
find Professor Hadfield's innovative solutions to transaction
documentation in a contracting wiki, through a prize competition, or
in some other harnessing of the power of networks. These approaches
are notably explored by Yochai Benkler in his book The Wealth of
Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and
Freedom,'9 which is itself available not only on a paid basis through
traditional publishing, but also through a gratis download available in
many formats. One of the benefits of such networked solutions is that
they can be tailored to help solve public goods problems that might
stymie traditional market-based transactions.
Paying for it can still be a help, however, even on the web. Would
Professor Hadfield's general counsel be willing to set up a private
representation market where the company puts contracts out to bid
among a pre-cleared group of service providers and then lets
competition, through some kind of purpose-designed auction, select
who gets the job? Amazon Mechanical Turk does this for minor,
19 YocHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOcIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
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routine tasks, but sites like Elance.com offer professional services "in
the cloud."2o In such a context, Professor Hadfield's suggestion for
relaxing the licensing rules on providers might have a greater role to
play in creating a market, although the gatekeeper and quality control
function governing whom the general counsel is willing to let into the
auction would have to be addressed by some other means.2 1 In his
book The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services,
Richard Susskind explores some of what this market might look like
and the rule changes that would be necessary to unleash it on the
world.22 And general counsel like United Technology's Chester Paul
Beach, Jr. are already putting portions of this approach to work in his
company's corner of the New Economy. 23
VI. CONCLUSION
Professor Hadfield's "Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy"
usefully identifies problems in the infrastructure of legal practice that
render it less helpful than it should be in meeting the structuring
needs of players in the new economy. Her overall argument would be
improved, however, by comparisons to industries where at least some
of her concerns have been faced and at least partly addressed in the
legal infrastructure that has evolved to serve them. Furthermore, her
suggested free-market solutions may be worth pursuing, but on
examination they seem at best tangential to ameliorating the
problems identified in her paper. Rather, successful solutions should
reflect the public goods nature of the problems and should make
bolder use of the new models for productive work that are emerging
from the New Economy itself.
20 ELANCE, http://www.elance.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
21 See Hadfield, supra note 1, at 57-59.
2 RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES
(2008).
23 Webcast: Future Ed Conference: New Business Models for U.S. and Global Legal
Education, Panel 1, held by New York Law School and Harvard Law School (Apr. 9, 2010),
http://nyls.mediasite.com/mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=lc4b6oa82cc 4
af6a5dadobdc29C2e9eld (remarks of Chester Paul Beach, Assoc. Gen. Counsel of United
Techs. Corp.).
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